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I INTRODUCTION
A continuing source of concern in man's exploration of space is the
potential for biological contamination of other planets. The possibility
exists that a planet such as Mars is capable of supporting terrestrial
microorganisms; hence, the landing of unsterilized space vehicles could
lead to widespread contamination.
Several reasons for concern of planetary contamination are evident.
One cause for alarm is the possibility of greatly impeding subsequent at-
tempts to detect indigenous life. In addition, many experts simply feel
that contamination would be morally reprehensible. Another concern sug-
gests that a proliferation of earthly microbes might impede future efforts
toward colonization.1* The apparent solution to these concerns is vigor-
ous sterilization of all spacecraft engaged in planetary exploration.
Sterilization can be costly, however, in terms of both direct expense and
reduced spacecraft reliability.
In response to concern over potential contamination of Mars, a plane-
tary quarantine resolution was adopted in 1966 by the Committee on Space
Research (COSPAR) of the International Council of Scientific Unions. This
resolution required that the spacefaring nations conduct their unmanned
explorations of Mars in such a way that the total probability of contami-
- - - - - - - 3
nation during a specified quarantine period not exceed 10 . In its de- -
sire to conform with this standard, the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) established a planetary quarantine policy, adminis-
tered by a planetary quarantine officer (PQO) whose responsibilities are
*
All references are listed at the end of this report.
broadly depicted in Figure 1. Given tentative plans as to the number and
character of future missions to Mars, the quarantine officer establishes
a maximum permissible value for the probability of contamination from in-
dividual missions. These upper bounds, widely known as mission "alloca-
tions," are set in such a way as to ensure program conformance with the
COSPAR constraint. The final level of decision-making is then to deter-
mine the engineering specifications that will most efficiently meet the
mission constraint. Some primary means of reducing contamination proba-
bilities from individual missions are trajectory biasing for fly-bys,
altitude restrictions for orbiters, and spacecraft sterilization for
landers. The central analytical problem of the planetary quarantine pro-
gram is to determine the probability of contamination under a variety of
different mission specifications. This we call the "mission contamination
problem." Its solution is a prerequisite for the determination of which
specifications meet a given mission constraint.
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FIGURE 1 THE HIERARCHY OF PLANETARY QUARANTINE DECISIONS
The purpose of this report is to discuss at a broad conceptual level
the analytical basis for planetary quarantine standards and procedures.
Attention is focused on the final phase of the decision process shown in
Figure 1, and discussion .is restricted to the case of landing missions.
To a large extent, current standards and procedures are based on the
probabilistic model of planetary contamination advanced by Sagan and
Coleman,whose work provided both the stimulus and the theoretical founda-
tion for the COSPAR resolution.2
Section II begins with a brief account of the Sagan-Coleman model.
We note that certain independence assumptions critical to their analysis
give an overly simplified characterization of the problem. It should be
emphasized, however, that our criticisms concern the structure of the
Sagan-Coleman model rather than the numerical values assigned to various
input parameters. Considerable debate and discussion3' of parameter
values have taken place but the basic structural assumptions and result-
ing formulas are widely accepted by COSPAR, NASA, and NASA contractors
as a means of determining sterilization requirements for Project Viking
and other future unmanned planetary missions.
In Section III, we discuss a classical problem in probability theory
that provides—at least in our opinion—a close conceptual parallel to
the type of dependence present in the contamination problem. The Sagan-
Coleman model fails to account for this dependence.
In Section IV, we indicate how the shortcomings of the Sagan-Coleman
analysis can be remedied by the adoption of a slightly richer model struc-
ture. By contrasting this formulation of the problem with those now in
use, we can identify both the type and the probable magnitude of error
introduced by current analytical procedures^. Our conclusion is that a
relatively minor modification of the basic Sagan-Coleman formula yields
a good approximation to the true probability of contamination in the range
of interest. The question remains, however, of how to obtain the input
parameters called for in this formula.
In Section V, we argue that those parameter values relating to the
survivability of terrestrial organisms in various regions of Mars should
be based on a model of potential mechanisms for growth and proliferation.
An example of such a model will be presented in the section.
A general theme underlying our entire presentation is the firm con-
viction that any analytical treatment of planetary quarantine requirements
must lie squarely in the domain of subjective probability assessment.
Much physical evidence exists relevant to the contamination issue (such
as the findings of Mariner 9), and large amounts of data (such as the
lethality of various sterilization treatments) are available on various
aspects of the problem. Inevitably, however, the quantification of ex-
pert scientific judgment will provide the ultimate means for integrating
all available information into an assessment of the total risk .of contam-
ination.
The model builder's task, therefore, is to structure a problem so
as to ease the burden of direct assessment as much as possible without
imposing or presuming relationships that may conflict with the expert's
judgment. The weaknesses of the Sagan-Coleman model do not arise from
any erroneous characterization of physical processes or objects; the
question is whether the assumptions of the model are consistent with
the current state of 'scientific information. A separate issue is the
ability of human beings—even very sophisticated ones—to directly assess
-4
probabilities as small as 10 . The Sagan-Coleman model requires experts
to make just such assessments. A relatively detailed proliferation model
of the type discussed in Section V is designed primarily to help overcome
this difficulty, although it yields additional benefits in improved com-
munication among experts.
Our conclusions and recommendations will be presented in Section VI.
II THE SAGAN-COLEMAN FORMULA
Let us consider a single mission to Mars. To be specific, we will
assume that a mission is intended to land a vehicle at some specified
equatorial site on Mars during July 1976. Given all mission specifica-
tions, including a proposed sterilization procedure, the mission contam-
ination problem is to determine the probability of
C = the event that Mars will be biological contaminated by
organisms aboard this spacecraft
in terms of more fundamental descriptors of the mission. Toward that
end, we further define
N = the number of viable organisms released to the Martian
environment or into its atmosphere from the spacecraft
(a random variable),
E(N) = > k P(N=k)
k=0
= the expected (or mean) number of' viable organisms
released,
G = the event that a single released organism will survive,
multiply, and contaminate a significant fraction of the
planet.
The solution advanced by Sagan and Coleman for the mission contamination
problem was the simple approximation
P(C) ~E(N)P(G) ' - - (1)
for which no justification was offered. The apparent rationale for this
approximation is as follows. With the definition
' th
E. = the event that the i released organism does not survive
to multiply and cause contamination,
it follows directly that
l-P(C) = P(E and...and E )
1 N
00
= / j P(N=k)P(E and...and E JN=k) + P(N=0) . (2)
k=l
If, given that k organisms are released, we assume the events E ,E ...,E
JL £> K.
*
to be mutually independent and of equal probability, then
P(E and...andE |N=k) =[p(E |N=k)] . (3)
1 k' 1
Moreover, if we assume that the survival of any one organism is indepen-
dent of the number of organisms released, then
p(ElJN=k) = P(EI) = I-P(G) . (4)
Substituting Eqs. (3) and (4) into Eq. (2) then gives us
l-P(C) =
k=0
k=l
*
The events E-L,E2,...,Em are called mutually independent if for all com-
binations l ^ i < j < . . . s m the multiplication rules
P(E and E.) = P(E.)P(E.)
P(E and E and E ) = P(E )P(E )P(E )
i J k i j k
P(E and...and E ) = P(E >P(E0)..,P(E )1 m 1 £ m
apply.
the approximation being justified by the fact that P(G) is very small,
and only moderate values of N have significant probability. This rela-
tionship is equivalent to Eq. (1).
Let us now consider the independence assumption underlying Eq. (3).
If the assumption is accepted, then the following must hold by definition.
Having learned that exactly k organisms were released and that none of
the first k-1 survived, we would not be inclined to alter our initial
assessment for the probability that the last will survive and proliferate.
We do not think this is a reasonable statement, and the reason lies in a
rather fundamental question. Why are we uncertain about the survival of
any single organism? To a large extent, many important characteristics
of the Martian environment are not yet known with certainty. The events
E ,...,E are mutually dependent on the actual character of-that environ-
1 k •
ment. Learning the fate of the first k-1 organisms tells us something
about Mars itself and in turn tells us something about the k organism's
chances of surviving and proliferating.
The extreme case of total dependence is illustrated by the following
scenario. Suppose that the current state of scientific knowledge admits
only two possibilities with respect to the Martian environment: either
it is so hostile that no terrestrial organism could possibly survive, or
it is so hospitable that the survival and proliferation of any such organ-
ism are ensured. In this case, the events E ,E , ... are totally depen-
1. ^
dent because knowing the fate of any one organism would automatically tell
-4
us the fate of the others. If we assign a probability of 10 to the hos-
pitable situation and 1-10 to the hostile one, then P(G) = 10 . Note,
i
however, that
-4
P(C) = P(NS1) X P(G) = P(N^ l) X (10 ) (5)
*
Under these conditions, the second and higher order terms in the expan-
sion of [l-P(G)] are negligible.
The value for P(C) given by Eq. (5) will typically be much smaller than
that given by Eq. (1). The actual state of current scientific informa-
tion would put us somewhere between the case of independence, on which
Eq. (1) is based, and the case of total dependence, on which Eq. (5) is
based.
Our objection to the independence assumption underlying Eq. (4) is
more subtle. As our spacecraft arrives on Mars, imagine that a scientific
expert is sequestered and denied any information other than unimpeachable
evidence that exactly ten viable organisms have been released. He is then
asked to assess the probability that the first organism released will sur-
vive and proliferate. Would this assessment be any different if he were
told that 1000 organisms had been released? Although we are not certain,
there is at least one reason why he might give different answers in the
two circumstances. Having learned that 1000 organisms were released, the
scientist might conclude that some engineering failure had led to a hard
landing, and thus released many encapsulated organisms. This in turn in-
creases the likelihood that the vehicle has impacted far from its targeted
landing site, which we shall assume is in the equatorial region. A criti-
cal uncertainty regarding the life-supporting capability of Mars concerns
the existence of liquid water and most scientists feel that even if liquid
water is on the planet, it is unlikely to be in the equatorial region.
Consequently, knowing tha-t many organisms'have been released might alter
the expert's assessment as to the accessibility of liquid water and hence
to the survivability of an individual organism. In summary, the number
of released organisms depends on the mode of landing, which in turn affects
survivability. Thus the events N = k and E are not independent; hence,
Eq. (4) is invalid. Another way of looking at this dependence is to say
that Mars is not in fact characterized by a single P(G) value. The proba-
bility that a single, released organism will survive and multiply depends
on where the organism is released. Consequently, an expert has difficulty
8
in making meaningful probability assessments within the framework of a
model that does not take explicit account of uncertainty about the actual
landing site and impact velocity. This point is pursued further below.
The Sagan-Coleman linear approximation P(C) ~ E(N)P(G) is a corner-
stone of current quarantine planning procedures. To illustrate its use,
-4
let us suppose that the mission allocation requires P(C)^ 10 . Then the
corresponding constraint on the mean number of viable organisms released
-4
is E(N)^ 10 /P(G). The probability P(G), which is obviously very small,
has been directly assessed by scientific experts, who have internally in-
tegrated the many factors that affect an organism's survivability on Mars.
In contrast, a great deal of laboratory experimentation and additional
modeling has been used in developing assessments for E(N) under various
sterilization procedures. We have argued that the linear approximation
is based on independence assumptions that are highly questionable. In
the following sections, we discuss the general notion of-dependent events
in a more familiar setting and then indicate how the Sagan-Coleman formu-
lation can be modified to eliminate its current weaknesses.
Ill A CLASSICAL PARALLEL PROBLEM
The following problem, which has been discussed in a slightly differ-
ent form by Howard, provides an example of a familiar physical process
having identical but informationally dependent trials. Its significance
to the mission contamination problem will be discussed shortly. Let us
suppose that a tack is dropped onto a large flat surface; it has two pos-
sible landing positions that are labelled "heads" and "tails" as in the
following diagram. You are told only that the tack in the diagram is
TAIL HEAD
drawn to scale, that a human being will drop it from a height of four
feet and that the landing surface is very flat. Your first problem is
to assess the probability of a head in one toss; your second problem is
to assess the probability of ten heads in ten tosses. To respond that
you do not know the probabilities, never having watched any tack tossing,
is unacceptable. The questions do not concern frequencies or any other
type of "physical fact." We ask only a quantification of your judgment
and recognize that different people will typically make different assess-
ments. Now suppose that'after much scrutiny of the diagram, you assess
the probability of a head in one toss to be one-half. Using only the
10
rules of consistency imposed by probability theory, is it possible to
deduce your response to the second question from this? The answer is no.
You simply have not told us enough about your -judgment (or state of infor-
mation) . Before any calculations.can be done (on your behalf), we need
to know something about how you feel the individual tosses relate to one
another. To fill in this gap, you might say that you view the events,
th
B. = the event of a head on the i toss (1 s i s 10) ,
as independent, in which case we immediately have
10 -3
P(10 heads in 10 tosses) = (1/2) =" 10
But, considering the characterization of independence given earlier, does
this assumption accurately reflect your state of information? It seems
unlikely, for undoubtedly you would be inclined to alter your initial as-
sessment for the probability of a head in one toss if we told you the re-
sults of the first nine tosses.
Having rejected the independence assumption, how can you compactly
express the degree of dependence that you perceive to exist among the
results of the separate trials? Under very mild assumptions,* it can
be shown that the following characterization provides all the required
information. Let
0 = the fraction of heads that would be observed
in a very long sequence of tosses,
which can be viewed only as a random variable with your current state of
information. What we need is your subjective (prior) probability distri-
bution for the random variable <t>. This is conveniently expressed by the
cumulative distribution function
F(x) = P(*sx), 0^ x^ i .
*
The assumption is that the trials be exchangeable. For a definition and
discussion of exchangeable trials see de Finetti.7
11
The mean (or expected value) of this distribution is given by*
f*-
= I [l-F(x)] dx ,E(*)
"0
and consistency demands that it equal 0.5. That is, the axioms of proba-
bility theory require that your subjective probability of a head in one
trial equal the mean of your subjective distribution for the fraction of
heads in a great many trials.
Figures 2 through 4 show three possible distribution functions for
the random variable <t>, each of which is consistent with the earlier as-
sessment that P(head) = one-half. The first of these distributions cor-
responds to the case of independent trials, the subject being absolutely
certain that the long-run fraction of heads will be 50 percent.t Such a
distribution might be assessed by an individual who has spent the last
few months tossing this same tack onto this same surface. Although he
is uncertain as to what will happen in a few trials, his complete knowl-
edge of the basic environment leads him to view the tack as equivalent
to an unbiased coin.
The second distribution (Figure 3) corresponds to the case of totally
dependent trials. The subject is absolutely certain that the tack will
always either come up heads or come up tails, but he is not sure which
of these cases pertains. (He might have an acquaintance who has tossed
the tack many times, told him it always falls one way, but left him to
guess from there.) He has assessed the probability of all heads to be
one-half and that of all tails to be one-half. Note that if this subject
*
Integration by parts shows this formula equivalent to the usual one in
terms of the density function or probability mass function.
t
Of course, the subject would also view the trials as independent if he
were certain that the long-run fraction would be 40 percent or any other
specific number.
12
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FIGURE 2 DISTRIBUTION IMPLYING INDEPENDENT TRIALS
F2<x) = P(0 < x)
1.0
0.5
I
0 0.5 1.0
FIGURE 3 DISTRIBUTION IMPLYING PERFECTLY DEPENDENT TRIALS
F3(x) = P(0 < xl
1.0
0.5
I I
0 0.5 1.0
. FIGURE 4 UNIFORM DISTRIBUTION
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were able to observe one toss, it would resolve all his uncertainty re-
garding the outcomes of subsequent tosses.
The type of distribution that we would generally expect, intermediate
to the preceding extreme cases, is shown in Figure 4. Here the subject
reveals great uncertainty as to the experiment's environment and assigns
a uniform distribution over the interval of possible values. The mean of
his distribution, like that of the others, is E(<t>) = one-half.
Given the probability distribution for 0, we can calculate the proba-
bility of all heads in n trials using the formula*
P(all heads in h trials) = E(4>n), nSl .
From this we have computed the relationships shown in Figure 5 for each
distribution discussed earlier. The subject who views the trials as in-
dependent thinks it very unlikely (less than one chance in a thousand)
that we could survive the ten trials without observing a tail. In con-
trast, the subject who views the trials as perfectly dependent continues
to assign a probability of one-half to the event of all heads, regardless
of how many times the tack is tossed. The corresponding relationship for
the third subject -lies between these-two extremes. In particular, he as-
sesses the probability of ten heads in ten trials to be about 9 percent,
one hundred times the probability implied by the first distribution.
Thus, we find that the three individuals differ greatly in their assess-
ment of what is likely to occur in repeated trials, although they agree
i
perfectly as to the probability of a head in a single trial. It is the
degree of informational dependence among trials that differs from one
subject to another, and these differences have significant implications.
* 7This is an application of de Finetti's theorem.
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IV THE EFFECT OF DEPENDENCIES IN THE CONTAMINATION PROBLEM
Returning now to the mission contamination problem, we wish to indi-
cate how the conceptual deficiencies of the Sagan-Coleman formulation can
be remedied by adopting a somewhat richer model structure. The discussion
in this section, however, should not be construed as a recommended proce-
dure for actually analyzing the problem. Drawing heavily on the thumbtack
parallel presented in Section III, we shall present an approach to the
problem that, although conceptually correct, would be very difficult to
implement. It provides, however, a means for discussing both the type
and the likely magnitude of error introduced by the Sagan-Coleman approx-
imation.
Figure 6 shows the level of modeling detail proposed by Sagan and
Coleman. The basic structure includes a biorelease model, whose output
is the mean number of released organisms; and a proliferation model that
consists of the linear relationship between contamination probability and
number of released organisms. We believe that the Sagan-Coleman model
structure must be enriched to at least the extent shown in Figure 7. Here
we have added an initial landing model, through which uncertainty as to
Sterilization
Procedure —.
BIORELEASE
MODEL
E(N) PROLIFERATION
MODEL:
P(C) = E(N) P(G)
FIGURE 6 BASIC LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF THE SAGAN-COLEMAN MODEL
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FIGURE 7 BASIC LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF THE PROPOSED MODEL
the technical success of the mission is expressed explicitly. As Figure
8 illustrates, this model component can take the form of a simple proba-
bility tree, can identify a relatively small number of possible mission
outcomes, and can associate a probability with each. For purposes of
illustration, we have distinguished two possibilities with respect to
landing site and three with respect to impact velocity. In particular,
letting
A1 (0.90)
O
(1.0)
(0.40)
A_ (0.05)
2
(0.60)
(0.05)
FIGURE 8 ILLUSTRATIVE LANDING MODEL
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Region 1 = that portion of Mars between 50° and 70° north
latitude,
Region 2 = the remainder of the planet,
we define the events
A = landing is soft,
A = landing is hard,
£*
A = mission fails to impact Mars,
o
B = landing is in Region 1,
B = landing is in Region 2.
&i
The branches emanating from the first node in Figure 8 give a probability
distribution over A , A and A . Branches emanating from subsequent nodes
1 2 3
correspond to a conditional distribution for the landing area, given im-
pact velocity. We emphasize that both the level of detail (number, of pos-
sibilities identified) and the probabilities in Figure 8 are purely illus-
trative. We have assumed here that the mission is targeted for an equa-
torial landing site.
To determine an appropriate level of detail for the description of
landing areas, the central consideration is the following. Each area
identified must be internally undifferentiated (given our current state
of information) in its ability to support growth of terrestrial organisms.
(We shall indicate in Section V why the particular geographical regions
identified above have been chosen for purposes of illustration.) After
the planet is partitioned in accordance with this criterion, the follow-
ing parallel to the thumbtack example can be drawn. Let us associate
the fates of individually released organisms with successive tosses of
indistinguishable tacks. The outcome "heads" will correspond to the event
of survival and proliferation, while "tails" will correspond to the organ-
ism's demise. The landing areas can be compared with homogeneous surfaces
18
of varying roughness; on each surface, we feel that the behavior of a
tack will be different. The number of released organisms corresponds
to the total number of tosses observed, and contamination corresponds
to the occurrence of at least one head. Our uncertainty as to whether
or not this will occur can be represented in stages by the probability
tree in Figure 9. Here we let
N = the number of organisms released in the event of a soft
landing (a random variable),
N = the number of organisms released in the event of a hard
<£
landing (a random variable),
f. = the fraction of a great many organisms released in Re-
gion j that would survive and proliferate (a random
variable), l^j^2.
LANDING
MODE
LANDING
AREA
NUMBER
RELEASED
ORGANISM
SURVIVABILITY
CONTAMINATION
OUTCOME
WHICH SURFACE
WILL WE TOSS ON?
HOW MANY TIMES
WILL WE TOSS?
WHAT WOULD THE
LONG-RUN FRACTION
OF HEADS BE?
WILL ANY HEADS
BE OBSERVED?
FIGURE 9 PROBABILITY TREE FORM OF THE PROPOSED MODEL
The random variable f corresponds to the long-run fraction of heads that
j
would result from a great many tack tosses on surface j. As we have seen
earlier, the distribution of f . is the" essential element required to com-
J
pute the probability of observing a head in repeated trials.
In drawing Figure 9, we have assumed that the distribution for a
•\
number of released organisms depends on impact velocity (hard versus soft
landing) but not on landing area. Although this is plausible and simpli-
fies calculations, it is by no means critical to our computational proce-
dure. A different distribution could be used, if appropriate, for each
combination of impact velocity and landing area. With our assumptions,
the biorelease model portrayed schematically in Figure 7 takes the simple
form of a probability distribution for N and another for N . Two such
J. ^
distributions are displayed for purposes of illustration in Figure 10.
Certain theoretical justifications exist for the assumption that each
distribution is Poisson; this simplifies calculations somewhat, but the
specific distributional form is unimportant to our general approach.
The last data required for the overall probability tree in Figure 9
are probability distributions for f and f . These two distributions to-
1. £
gether constitute the proliferation model schematically represented earlier
in Figure 7. An illustrative distribution for f is displayed in Figure
11. Because the numbers are extremely small, it is graphically convenient
to show a complementary cumulative distribution function, which simply
equals one minus the ordinary cumulative distribution function at all
points. The dotted lines give a step-function approximation to the con-
\
tinuous curve; this step function corresponds to the discrete distribution
for f shown in Figure 12. In all subsequent calculations, we shall use
this discrete -approximation to the original distribution. Figure 12 shows
the first two moments of the discrete distribution.
20
N , - 2
N. has a Poisson distribution with mean m.,
where m = 1 and m = 1000. Thus
E(N.) = m. , + m. .
N2 = 0
N 2 - 1
.
 k) _
FIGURE 10 ILLUSTRATIVE RELEASE MODEL
Recall from the thumbtack problem that E(f ) equals the probability
j^
of observing k heads in as many tosses. Analogously, E(f ) is the prob-
ability that, if k organisms were released in Region 1, all of them would
multiply and proliferate. In particular, E(f ) gives the probability
that a single released organism will multiply and proliferate, meaning
that it represents a P(G) assessment for Region 1. Figure 12 shows this
-5
to be 1.0 X 10 with our illustrative data. An illustrative distribution
for f is shown in Figure 13, and the corresponding discrete approximation
£
—6
is given in Figure 14. Observe that E(f ) is 1.9 X 10 , so Region 1 is£
perceived as more hospitable to terrestrial organisms than is Region 2.
21
o
cc
LL
HI
I
>
-
_
2 <
S =
go
Q. (/}
lU
I
I-
X
A
10,-2
n-6
10,-8
COMPLEMENTARY
CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION
FUNCTION FOR f,,
THE FRACTION OF
ORGANISMS SURVIVING
IN REGION 1
10,-10 10" 10 10,-4 10-2
FIGURE 11 ILLUSTRATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF REGION 1 SURVIVABILITY
ASSOCIATED
PROBABILITIES
9 x 10
9 x 10
9 x 10
9 x 10'
9 x 10
9 x 10"
1 x 10~
,-1
,-2
,-3
-5
FIGURE 12 DISCRETE APPROXIMATION FOR THE REGION 1
SURVIVABILITY DISTRIBUTION
22
oo
I
10-2
3 £ 10-*
5 <
m rr
. UJI
x"
 10
A
-6
10'
10-10
COMPLEMENTARY
CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION
FUNCTION FOR f2,
THE FRACTION OF
ORGANISMS SURVIVING
IN REGION 2
10-8 10-6 to-4 10-2
FIGURE 13 ILLUSTRATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF REGION 2 SURVIVABILITY
E(f2) = 1.9 io-6
E(f^) = 5.2 x 10'10
PROBABILITY
9 x 10"
9 x 10
9 x 10
9 x 10
9 x 10
-2
-3
-4
,-5
1 x 10,-5
FIGURE 14 DISCRETE APPROXIMATION FOR THE REGION
2 SURVIVABILITY DISTRIBUTION
23
We now wish to roll back the probability tree shown in Figure 9 so
as to determine P(C), the total probability of contamination. If we knew
that k organisms were released in region j and we were told the value for
f ., the corresponding conditional probability of contamination would be
J
P(c|Ai,B.,N =k,f .) = 1- (1-f .)k .
Removing the conditioning on f . and N. then yields
/ N-\
P(C|A B ) = 1-E (1-f ) M .
J
 \ J /
Here the expectation is taken over both f. and N., and we shall assume
throughout that these random variables are conditionally independent
given A. and B.. Completing the rollback then yields the final formula
(6)X
s
 v^ r / N-\~2-f2^p<A-B-> I-E (i-f) M
1=1 J=l J L \ /.
With our assumption that N has a Poisson distribution, we note that
i
-m
Thus, the master formula, Eq. (6), simplifies to
-
 l
1=1 j=i J
/ i J \
~
E(e / •
where the expectation is over f only. Using the distributions for f
j 1
and f given in Figures 12 and 14, we find that
*
That is, compute total probability by multiplying conditional probabili-
ties in the usual way, working from the final stage of the tree back to
the initial stage.
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/ 12\ / J ' 2 \
- E (e ) = 1 - E ^e J = 1.9 X
-mf -lOOOf
- E (e -1 = 1 -E ( e )= 5.4 X
-m f > -lOOOf
 v/ 2 2\ / 2\
- E (e )•= I - E I e J = 1.8 X
Also, from Figure 8,
P(\*2) = 0.90, P(A2B1) = 0.02, P^ B^  = 0.03,
so formula (7) gives us
—•£? o o
P(C) = (0.9)(1.9X10 ) + (0.02)(5.4 X 10~ )+ (0.03)(1.8X10~ )
= 1.6 X 10~4
Thus, with our illustrative data, the total probability of contamination
is slightly larger than the current mission allocation for Project Viking.
Again with our illustrative data, the reader may verify that the
nominal landing A B (which has a 90%"probability) makes an insignificant
1 ^
contribution to P(C). The dominant factor in the computation is the large
expected number of released organisms upon hard landing, with the rela-
tively higher probabilities of proliferation associated with Region 1
also playing an important role. The contribution of the nominal landing
to P(C)- would remain insignificant if m , the expected number of organ-
isms released by a soft landing, were increased from 1 to as much as 40
or 50.
Although the model structure described in this section is conceptu-
ally sound and accounts for all of the dependencies ignored in the Sagan-
Coleman formulation, the resulting analytical procedure appears impracti-
cal. The reason is that the distributions for f would be difficult to
J
obtain, at least directly, as we shall explain later. It is natural then
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to seek convenient approximations, such as those used by Sagan and Cole-
man. For each landing outcome A B , we might approximate the conditional
i J
probability of contamination by
r N-i
PCCIAJ3..) = l-E|(l-f_.) M -E(N1)E(fJ)
since E(f .) is simply a region-specific P(G) assessment. Substituting
J
this in Eq. (6) would have us approximate P(C) by
2 2
Q(C) = P(A.B.)E(N.)E(f .) . (8)
1=1 J=l 1
The approximation P(C) — Q(C) is identical to the Sagan-Coleman formula,
except we have added an initial conditioning on landing outcome. This
approximation has some very attractive properties. In Appendix I, it
will be shown under very mild assumptions that
Q(C) > P(C) s Q(C) - EB , (9)
where the error bound EB is given by
2 2
EB = ^  /.X, P(A.B.)E(N2)E(f2) (10)
~ T™?* *r~^  ! J ! Ji=l j=l
That is, the approximation P(C) — Q(C) is conservative in that it can only
overstate the true probability of contamination, and the degree of over-
statement is bounded above by the second-moment expression EB. With the
illustrative data presented in Figures 8, 10, 12 and 14, we find that
Q(C) = (0.90) (1.0) (1.9 X 10~6) + (0.02) (1000) (1 X 10~5)
+ (0.03) (1000) (1.9 X 10~6) = 2.6 X 10~4 ,
while
EB = - | (0.90)(2)(5.2 X 10~10) + (0 .02) (1Q6) (3 .7 X 10~8)
2 (
+ (0.03)(106)(5.2 X 10~10) = 1.2 X 10~4 .
26
Thus, using Eq. (9), we arrive at the upper and lower bounds
-4 -4
1.4 X 10 ^ P(C) ^ 2.6 X10 ,
-4
which agree with the exact value of P(C) =1.6 X 10 computed earlier.
With our illustrative data, the first-moment approximation Q(C) overstates
the true value of P(C) by a factor of about 1.6, but the absolute'error
-4(1 X 10 ) is, of course, very small.
We have indicated that the exact computational procedure described
earlier would be difficult to implement. To understand the reason for
this, one need only look at the scales in Figures 11 and 13. To obtain
the distributions of f and f directly from scientific experts, one
1 2
would have to ask such questions as, "Would you assign a probability as
-4
large as 10 to the event of more than one in a thousand organisms sur-
viving and proliferating in Region 1?" Experience in the encoding of
subjective probability distributions indicates that even very sophisti-
cated subjects have difficulty dealing with numbers smaller than about
one in a hundred. To encode a distribution for f or f would require
1 ^
that the subject deal with pairs of numbers that both lie below this
threshold of comprehensibility.
To compute the quantity Q(C) requires only the means of f and f ,
~~~~~~—~~~ 1 2
which are equivalent to region-specific P(G) assessments rather than to
their entire distributions. It is then natural to ask whether the approx-
imation P(C) — Q(C) is adequate for purposes of the planetary quarantine
program. Although this is difficult to answer definitively, our feeling
is that the approximation does suffice for the following reasons.
First, the only possible error that can be introduced is on the con-
servative side, so any sterilization program that yields a Q(C) value
smaller than the mission allocation is guaranteed to meet program stan-
dards. Second, computations that we have done indicate that the error
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introduced by the approximation is insignificant in the following sense.
-4
If the data are such that the true P(C) value lies below 1 X 10 (the
current mission allocation for Project Viking), then Q(C) approximates
P(C) quite closely except when the distributions of N. and f . have cer-
tain very unlikely characteristics. (These characteristics will be de-
scribed later.) In contrast, one can construct plausible-looking dis-
-2 -3
tributions that yield P(C) values in the range of 10 to 10 , under
which the approximation is very poor (meaning that Q(C) overstates P(C)
by as much as an order of magnitude). Such possibilities give little
cause for alarm, however, because using the approximation P(C) ~ Q(C) in
such cases, we would correctly reject as inadequate the corresponding
sterilization procedure.
In summary, our general feeling is that the approximation P(C) — Q(C)
is a good one in the range of interest, but one must remain alert for the
pathological situations in which it becomes overly conservative. The
lower bound in Eq. (9) gives a ready means of identifying, at least qual-
itatively, what these pathological situations are. Note that the expres-
sion in Eq. (10) for the error bound can be rewritten as
2 2
( 2 I
EB = - ~l-t p<AiB-)| CEC^)] + Var(N_.)
i=l j=l
j[E(f .)f + Var(f .){ .
I J J 1
If the variances of each N and f are set to zero, then EB becomes in-
i J
significant in comparison with Q(C) over the range of interest. As these
variances become very large, however, the error bound grows correspondingly,
and the accuracy of our first-moment approximation is ended. Thus, unfavor-
ably, the distributions of some N. and f . are very widely spread, giving
rise to large variances. Actual computation indicates that the degree of
spread must be extreme to seriously affect the approximation in the range
of interest.
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As already noted, the approximation P(C) — Q(C) is identical to the
Sagan-Coleman formula except that an initial conditioning on landing out-
come has been added. Since the initial conditioning adds a certain amount
of complexity to the data gathering and subsequent analysis, it is natural
to ask if it is really necessary. We strongly believe that it is, and our
illustrative data demonstrate the reasons.
With our data, the expected number of organisms released by the mis-
sion is
 2 2
E(N) = /./ , P(A B )E(N )
1=1 J=l
= (0.90)(1) + (0.02)(1000) + (0.03)(1000) - 50 .
Similarly, the probability that any one organism released by the mission
will survive and proliferate is
2 2 2 2
P(G) =(£-,^ _/P(A,B.)P(G|B.) = / ,/ J P(A.B )E(f .;
i=l j=l X J J i=l j=l X J J •
= (0.90)(1.9 X 10~6) + (0.02)(1 X 10~5) + (0.03)(1.9 X 10~6)
=1.96 X 10~6 .
Thus, the original Sagan-Coleman formula would give us
P(C) E^(N)P(G) = (50)(1.96 X 10~ ) = 9.8 X 10~5
-4
Our exact calculations showed that P(C) = 1.6 X 10 , so this approxima-
tion actually understates the probability of contamination. Taking a
product of expected values rather than the expected value of the product,
we are no longer assured that the final approximation is an upper bound
for the true value. The reason 'is that the original Sagan-Coleman formula
fails to account for the potential dependence between the number of re-
leased organisms and the survivability of any one organism, as was pointed
29
out in Section II. This dependence is very strong with our illustrative
data because the unfavorable.events of landing hard (releasing many organ-
isms) and landing in Region 1 (which is judged more hospitable to terres-
trial organisms) tend to occur together. By forming a Sagan-Coleman
approximation for each landing outcome and then taking an expected value
over the landing outcomes, we account for this dependence and ensure that
an upper bound for P(C) is ultimately derived.
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V ENRICHING THE PROLIFERATION MODEL
In the previous section, we indicated that for most cases of interest
in the quarantine analysis for Project Viking, P(C) can be adequately
approximated by
Q(c) =££P(A B ) E(N ) P(G|B )
i J i J i 3
This conclusion results in the following outstanding analytical problems.
(1) The level of detail to represent landing outcomes (that
is, the number and type of events A.^ and BJ identified
in the landing model).
(2), The manner of determining the parameters PCA-^Bj), E(N.),
and P(GJB,).
J
The first of these issues has been discussed earlier. On the matter of
parameter values, much analytical effort has been spent in building sub-
models to determine E(N.) under various types of sterilization procedures
and with various landing mode events A.^ . In a similar way, the landing "
outcome probabilities can be assessed by a submodel that accounts for
the laws of orbital mechanics, historical data on component reliability,
and so forth. To determine the proliferation probabilities, however,
the possibilities for further modeling are not quite so obvious. In the
past, the single proliferation probability P(G) called for in the Sagan-
Coleman formula has been directly assessed by scientific experts. In
making such an assessment, the expert must internally integrate all of
the various considerations that contribute to his uncertainty about an
organism's survival on Mars. Some of the most important such considera-
tions are schematically represented in Figure 15. The center line of
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the figure contains characteristics of the mission, characteristics of
the released organism, and specific physical events that are required
for growth and proliferation. The upper and lower lines portrary char-
acteristics of the Martian environment that influence the likelihood of
those events.
Water is of particular importance among the environmental charac-
teristics. No known terrestrial organisms can proliferate in the absence
of HgO, and most organisms require it in the liquid state. The atmospheric
pressure almost everywhere on Mars is thought to be less than the triple-
point pressure of water. Thus, proliferation of most species would re-
quire transport to some nonequilibrium microenvironment, such as a pres-
sure pocket under a polar cap, where water can exist in the liquid state.
If such microenvironments exist at all, they are probably rare and rela-
tively inaccessible.
In contrast, relatively large amounts of water ice are known to exist
on the Martian surface. Some species of cryotolerant terrestrial organism
are capable of obtaining enough moisture from ice in the temperature range
between -15°C and 0°C to sustain growth and proliferation. We shall use
the term aerophiles to mean facultative anaerobes that have this capabil-
ity. As the name indicates, this is an organism particularly well-suited
for growth in the very dry and essentially oxygen-free Martian environment.
Another environmental characteristic of importance is the amount.of
shielding against UV radiation that is afforded by Martian dust. Because
the daytime UV flux at the planet's surface is severe enough to render
almost any organism nonviable within a few hours, the long-distance trans-
port would require some such shielding mechanism. Another major source
of uncertainty relating to transport is the strength and direction of
Martian winds at the point and time of release.
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The basic goal in building a proliferation model is to reduce its
complexity. A structure must be created that can replace a few large
questions with a series of smaller, more readily comprehensible ones.
Hence, the scientific expert could develop personal assessments for the
key parameters P(G[B.) from more fundamental assessments that reflect
J
his uncertainty about such factors as those depicted in Figure 15.
In this section, we shall present a simple example of such a model.
We emphasize, however, that both the numerical data and the model struc-
ture are intended solely as illustrations. The model is predicated on
the supposition that the total threat of contamination is traceable
almost entirely to the class of terrestrial organisms that we have called
areophiles. The overall model structure is shown in Figure 16. It takes
the form of a probability tree that represents in stages our uncertainty
about proliferation of a single, released organism, given a specific
landing area event B-. (We shall continue to speak in terms of the two
landing regions defined in Section IV, i.e., Region 1 corresponds to B
IS THIS
AN
EXTENT OF
"WATER" IN
AREOPHILE?! THE REGION
M
MEAN LIFETIME
OF AREOPHILES
IN THE REGION
ACTUAL
LIFETIME
OF THE
AREOPHILE
TIME REQUIRED
TO REACH
A SUITABLE
ENVIRONMENT
PROLIFERATION
OUTCOME
FIGURE 16 AN ILLUSTRATIVE PROLIFERATION MODEL (FOR A SINGLE RELEASED
ORGANISM) TO GENERATE
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and Region 2 corresponds to B . The first node of the tree represents
£t
the occurrence or nonoccurrence of the event
M = the released organism is an areophile ,
and we shall assume the probability assessment
P(M) = 0.001,
independent of the landing area B.. Such an assessment would of course
reflect a belief that areophiles are rare among those viable organisms
aboard the spacecraft. This point will be discussed later. For the
case ~ M, meaning that the organism is not an areophile, we assess the
proliferation probability directly with no further modeling. We assume
the assessments
7 Q
P(G|B , ~ M) = i x 10" , P(G|B , ~ M) = i x 10" ,
J. £
meaning that proliferation by a nonareophile is considered somewhat more
probable in Region 1 but very unlikely in either event.
Given that the organism is areophilic, the next two stages of our
probability tree reflect the uncertainty surrounding critical features
of the landing area. We define
X. = the fraction of Region j that is characterized by the
intermittent presence of water ice in the temperature
. range between -15°C and 0°C, 1 <• j £ 2,
H,. = the mean time of viability (in hours) that would be
observed if a great, many areophiles were released in
Region j, 1 £ j s 2.
Both of these definitions deserve some comment. The random variable X.
J
is intended to represent the fraction of Region j that provides the neces-
sary moisture for growth and proliferation of areophiles. Transport to
such a site is then required for areophilic growth; however, growth is
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not guaranteed. The definition of p,. is rather subtle. It requires a
J
hypothetical experiment that releases many areophiles into the region;
then they are observed until they are rendered nonviable. Because such
an experiment has not been performed (and probably never will be), the
resulting long-run average lifetime can only be viewed as an uncertain
quantity. In this regard, it is similar to the long-run fraction of
heads, <J>, that we used in conceptualizing the thumbtack problem. Our
uncertainty as to the value of (j,. results primarily from lack of knowl-
J
edge about the degree of shielding provided by the Martian dust and the
fraction of organisms that would acquire it before becoming nonviable.
Illustrative distributions for X and X are given in Figure 17.1 2 .
The reader may verify that the expected value of X is about one percent,
while the expected value of X is about one-tenth of a percent. Thus,
Region 1 is considered roughly about ten times more hospitable to areophiles
than is the remainder of the planet. The reason for our original differ-
entiation between Region 1 and the remainder of the planet is that the
portion of Mars between 50° and 70° north latitude provides optimal con-
ditions for the existence of water ice in the critical temperature range.
Temperatures throughout the area are below freezing during the night, but
they approach the freezing point in daylight. It is of course simplistic
to say that conditions throughout Region 1 are uniform, as the level of
detail in our model would imply. In a similar way, to differentiate
among other areas of the planet is certainly possible; but for ease of
exposition, we shall proceed as if both Region 1 and Region 2 were in-
ternally homogeneous (given our current state of information).
An illustrative discrete distribution for u is given in Figure 18.
We shall suppose that u. has the same distribution, and for both j = 1
&
and j = 2 it will be assumed.that X. and jx. are independent random
J J
variables.
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1 x 10
1 x 10
-3
,-2
1 x 10-1
ASSOCIATED
PROBABILITY
0.02
0.05
0.03
0.60
0.03
VAL^JE
1 x 10~5 .
A
1 x 10
1 x 10~3
1 x 10~2
1 x 10~1
ASSOCIATED
PROBABILITY
0.05
0.50
0.40
0.03
0.002
FIGURE 17 ILLUSTRATIVE DISTRIBUTIONS FOR EXTENT OF "WATER" IN
REGION 1 AND REGION 2
•Distributions of and
M VALUE* ASSOCIATED
(HOURS) PROBABILITY
0.13
0.25
0.50
0.10
0.02
are identical.
FIGURE 18 ILLUSTRATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF MEAN LIFETIME FOR AREOPHILES
RELEASED ON THE MARTIAN SURFACE
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The final stages of the probability tree shown in Figure 16 reflect
uncertainty surrounding the critical quantities.
T = the actual time of viability for the released areophile,
Z = the time required for the released areophile to reach a
suitable environment (i.e., a site characterized by the
intermittent presence of water ice between -15°C and 0°C).
It will be assumed that the conditional distribution of T is given by
P(T S t|fi., M, X., (J,.) - 1 - e~t/M/J, t s o .
J J J
That is, T has a negative exponential distribution that has mean jj,. but
does not depend on X.. (Although there are certain possible theoretical
J
justifications for the use of a negative exponential distribution, we
are using this particular distributional form only to simplify our illus-
trative computations.) In a similar way, we shall assume that A has a
conditional distribution of a negative exponential form that depends on
X. but not on jj,.; the general form is
J J
P(Z <• Z|B., M, X., u.., T) = 1 - e~ J z,
 z > o.
J J J
The distributional parameter A.(X .) will be set so that the probability of
the areophile reaching a suitable environment during the first hour of
its transport equals X.; the fraction of Region j is classified as suit-
J
able. That is, we take
- X ).
J
The final stage of the probability tree in Figure 16 represents our
uncertainty as to whether the areophile will proliferate, given all in-
formation contained in previous stages of the tree. If T < Z, meaning
that the organism is rendered nonviable before reaching a suitable envir-
onment, then of course the probability of proliferation is zero. If
T s z, we are still not certain of proliferation, because such questions
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remain as the availability of on-site UV shielding, the presence of pre-
formed organic materials necessary for anaerobic growth, and so forth.
To account for this remaining uncertainty, we assume the assessment
P(G|M, T ;> z) = o.io,
this probability being independent of the area of release.
We now have all the data necessary to roll back the probability tree
in Figure 16 to obtain an overall assessment for P(g|n.). With our dis-
J
tributional assumptions, it is easy to show that
P(T £ Z | B . , M, X., n.) = X . ( X . ) H . / Cl + X . ( X . ) n J ,
J J J J J J J J J
so that
P(G|B , M) = (o.io) E ( X (x )p, / [i + x (x )n ] ) .
j \ j J J J J J /
Here, the expectation is taken over both X and u. , which we have assumed
J j
independent. Using this formula and the distributions given earlier for
i -4
X. and p,., the reader may verify that P(G|B., M) = 4.25 X 10 ,
J J «J "
P(G|B , M) = 5.12 x io~ .
The rollback is then completed by
P(G|B.) = P(M|B.)P(G|B. , M) + P(~M|B.)P(G|B. , ~M) ,j j j j j
which yields
P(G|B.) = (0.001)(4.25 X 10~3) + (0.999)(1 X 10~7) = 4.35 X 10~6,
J
P(GJB ) = (0.001)(5.12 X 10~4) + (0.999)(1 X 10~8) = 5.22 X 10~?.
^ .- . _
At this point, the objective of the proliferation model has been met.
The proliferation probabilities generated by the model can be integrated
with other data by means of the modified Sagan-Coleman approximation dis-
cussed in Section IV and repeated at the beginning of this section. The
use of the landing and release data given in Section IV yields a total
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contamination probability of
2 2
P(C) =- Q(C) = P(A B ) E ( N . ) P ( G B . )
^-rf ^- i J i J
1=1 j=l
7 fi
= (0 .90)(1)(5 .22 X 10~ )+ (0.02)(1000)(4.35 X 10~ )
-7 -4
+ (0.03)(1000)(5.22 X 10 ) = 1.0 X 10
Thus, with our illustrative data and model structure, the total contami-
nation probability is approximately equal to the current mission alloca-
tion for Project Viking. In this regard, it is relevant to note that
some of our illustrative data may be quite optimistic from the standpoint
of potential contamination. For example, the mean of our distribution
for X is about one percent, but we have encountered some expert belief
that a more reasonable figure would be ten or even twenty percent. Also,
we have used 0.10 as the probability that an areophile, having reached
a suitable environment, will ultimately proliferate. Some expert opinion
would have this as high as 0.50. Perhaps most important is the probabil-
ity of 0.001 that we have associated with the event of a released orga-
nism being areophilic. This might be as high as 0.01 or even 0.10 in
the opinion of some experts. The question here is what percentage of
those organisms that are sufficiently heat resistant to survive terminal
sterilization would also fall into our category of areophiles. Much
uncertainty appears to cloud the answer, but laboratory experimentation
could of course shed much light on the issue.
We have already indicated that a richer model structure reduces com-
plexity and replaces a few large questions with a sequence of smaller,
more readily comprehensible ones. Another advantage of additional model-
ing relates to the well-documented difficulty of directly assessing very
small probabilities. If a person says he assesses the probability of
-4 -6
event E to be 10 and that of event E to be 10 , then you can be quite
1 £i
sure that he considers both events unlikely, with E more likely than E .i £
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Experience indicates, however, that caution should be taken in attaching
any absolute significance to the numerical assessments. Would he, for
example, rather bet on E occurring or on being dealt a royal flush in a
£
game of 5-card stud poker? Since calculation will show that the latter
-6
event has a probability of about 1.5 X 10 , the person's assessment would
lead to the conclusion that he prefers to bet on the royal flush. Yet
one can hardly be confident that such a preference would emerge if the
question were asked directly. The problem is that, when asked to assess
probabilities smaller than (say) 1/100, we all have difficulty conjuring
up familiar reference events that we perceive to be of comparable likeli-
— 2 • —3
hood. In many applications, a probability of 10 or 10 can in fact
be used as a working definition of impossibility. One might argue that
scientists are unusually comfortable working with numbers as small as
-3
10
 t but we are not convinced that they are accustomed to explicitly
dealing with subjective probabilities of this magnitude. One aid that
the analyst can provide is a set of familiar reference events—such as
the royal flush example if the expert happens to be a poker player—
i
against which relative likelihood can be compared. Greater assistance
is usually provided by enriching the model structure and by recognizing
that most rare events can be decomposed into a sequence of requisite com-
ponent events. By modeling that sequence and encoding the conditional
probability of each given the occurrence of its predecessors, we enable
the expert to assess only probabilities of a readily comprehensible
magnitude.
Up to now we have addressed only the problem of how a single scien-
tific expert can be aided in developing a quantitative assessment of
planetary contamination risks that is logically consistent with his
information and judgment. There is no particular reason to think that
two different experts will arrive at the same assessments. In developing
a planetary quarantine policy, however, NASA is clearly concerned with
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the matter of consensus. One would hope that disagreement among experts
is traceable to differences in the information available to them and
hence is resolvable by exchanging information.- Such intercourse can be
greatly facilitated if assessments are built up from a model structure
fine enough to demonstrate which specific aspects of the problem (such as
existence of liquid water in the equatorial region) are judged differently.
Finally, it is apparent that the relative expertise of most scientists is
not uniform over all considerations relevant to Martian contamination.
This has already been implicitly recognized in the use made of the Sagan-
Coleman model. The community of experts asked to assess the value of m
under various sterilization procedures is almost totally separate from
the community considered most expert in assessing P . Therefore, model-
g
ing more of the uncertain Martian characteristics that contribute to our
uncertainty about contamination would allow further differentiation of
expertise.
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VI SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In the initial sections of this report, we have discussed the
likely fundamental inadequacies in the model of planetary contamination
advanced by Sagan and Coleman. Subsequent investigation shows, however,
that a relatively minor modification of the basic Sagan-Coleman formula
yields approximations that are generally adequate with data in the range
of interest. This approximation formula differs from the original Sagan-
Coleman version only through an initial conditioning on landing outcome.
It always yields an upper (conservative) bound for the total probability
of contamination. We have shown that this appealing feature is lost if
the conditioning on landing outcome is deleted.
Because the initial conditioning requires that we differentiate be-
tween various geographical areas of the planet, it yields additional
benefits. If several missions are sent to Mars and targeted for different
landing sites, the individual mission contamination probabilities may
not be the same. With the analytical structure that we have proposed,
such differences are automatically accounted for by appropriately adjust-
ing the landing model probabilities. The reader may verify that if the
illustrative landing data in Figure 8 are changed to indicate a target
site in Region 1, the total probability of contamination will increase by
almost an order of magnitude.
In Section V, we have discussed the question of how parameter values
called for in the approximation formula should be assessed. We have
recommended that the region-specific probabilities of growth and prolifera-
tion be built up from a supporting model structure. There are three basic
reasons for this recommendation. First, such a model helps the scientific
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expert to systematically organize his information and judgment about all
the diverse factors- that are relevant to the process of proliferation
on Mars. Second, by building up an assessment in stages, .we reduce the
extent to which experts must deal with probabilities of incomprehensively
small magnitude. Finally, a supporting model structure provides a means
for better communication when disagreements arise among experts.
The uncertainty surrounding the possible contamination of Mars by
terrestial microbes can only be addressed through the subjective judgment
of experts. This judgment depends on very limited available knowledge,
particularly on the Martian environment. A quantitative summary of this
judgment can be made in the form of a subjective possibility assessment.
Assessing a probability of contamination is a difficult task, but the need
for such an assessment was clearly established by 1966 as part of the NASA
planetary quarantine policy.
The contribution of this report has been to illustrate how structur-
ing the available information can yield better overall assessment of the
probability of contamination. Explicitly including uncertainty on land-
ing mode and landing site appears to be the most important element in
carrying out an improved assessment. We have shown in Section V how
further refinement can be obtained by modeling the process of transporting
certain organisms in a viable state to a location on Mars that would
permit them to proliferate. Such a model would allow expert judgment to
be assembled and critically examined in a more careful and comprehensive
manner.
The great advantage of describing subjective uncertainty through
formal probability assessments lies in the role of such assessments within
the broader conceptual framework of decision analysis.8 The central idea
of this analytical discipline for the treatment of decisions under uncer-
tainty is to separate the issues of value and likelihood. On the one
hand, we assess (appropriately conditional) probabilities for the uncertain
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events that impinge on our decision; on the other hand, we associate
value assessments with each of the outcomes ultimately possible as a con-
sequence of the actions taken. The probabilities and value assessments
can then be integrated in a systematic and rational way. An-application
of this procedure to space project planning is given by Matheson and
Roths,9 and the same conceptual framework underlies the discussion of
Levinthal, Lederberg, and Sagan.1 If uncertainty is measured in any way
other than through probability assessments, then we no longer know how
to integrate such measures with value assessments to reveal the preferred
course of action. We believe that the language of subjective probability,
as part of the broader conceptual framework of decision analysis, can be
of great value in solving the resource allocation problems that arise at
all levels of scientific investigation.
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Appendix
DERIVATION OF THE ERROR BOUND
Recall that in Section II we defined E to be the event that the n
n
released organism does not survive to mult iple and cause contamination.
It is then immediate that
k \
< ~ E , l A . LP ( C J A i f B. , N = k) =P( U (~ E ) A f B. , N = k .
n=l
That is, contamination is equivalent to one or more of the events E , ...,
E not occurring. The probability of this union can be bounded both above
K
and below by the use of the following relationships. For an arbitrary
collection of events Z , Z , . . . , Z , it is well known that
J. £ K.
\ n /\ n=l /
while k k n-1/ k \
U z >Vp(z ) -> V*p(z , z )
n/ *-^ n *—* t—t n m
•
n=1
 ' n=l n=2 m=l
P
For our problem, this implies
P I U (~ En) JAi , B . , NA = k 1 <• l^i p(~ En I Ai < B • • NA = k> •
\ n=l / n=l
while k/ k v
Pi U (~ E ) , B , N = k > *i P(~ E A , B , N = k)
\n= l n 1 J 1 / n=l »• 1 J 1
k n-1
P(~ E , ~ E A , B , N = k) .
n n i j i
n=2 m=l
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We have stated in Section IV that the contamination problem can be treated
by analogy to our thumbtack example. In precise mathematical terms, this
means that we think it is reasonable to assume that, given a specific
landing area, the events E , E , ... can be viewed as exchangeable? This,
1 ^
along with our other assumptions, implies that
P (~ E IA , B , N = k) = E(f ), 1 ^  n <. k ,
n' i j i j
and for any m ^ n ,
P (~ E , ~ E (A. , B., N. = k) = E(f . )
n m i j i j
Combining all these relationships then gives us
k E(f ) > P (cJA , B , N = k )j V i j i /
S k E(f ) - \ k(k - 1) E(f ) > k E(f ) - \ k E(f ) .
j j j j
Taking the expected value with respect to N. then yields
E ( N . ) E ( f .) 5 P(c|A B ) :> E(N )E(f .) - \ E(N )E(f ) .
i . J i J i J i j
Finally, taking the expected value over all possible landing outcomes
gives us
Q(C) > P(C) ^  Q(C) - EB
where Q(C) and EB are defined as in Section V.
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